Monday, September 22, 2025

Utopian Thought and Extremism of the Right and the Left


In Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction, L. T. Sargent (2010) defines utopianism as a “social dream”: an idealized vision of perfect societies meant to overcome human imperfection. 

Yet, as Karl Popper argued in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), attempts to realize utopias through political engineering often lead to tyranny because they demand uniformity, suppress dissent, and justify coercion in pursuit of a “higher good.”

This article examines how utopian thinking shapes both left-wing and right-wing extremism. It covers:

  1. Anarcho-capitalism — a right-wing utopia of markets without a state.

  2. Neo-Marxism — a left-wing utopia of perfect equality through planning and control.

  3. Support for Hamas — a utopia of “resistance” that ignores its theocratic and terrorist reality.

  4. Far-right imperial presidencies (Trump, Putin, Orbán) — contemporary examples of authoritarian utopianism that threaten liberal open societies.


I. Anarcho-Capitalism: the Utopia of a “Non-Regulated Society”

Anarcho-capitalism abolishes the state, leaving law, justice, and security to private competition. This reflects what Popper would call utopian social engineering: the belief that one bold design can erase the imperfections of history.

  • Fallacy: assumes spontaneous order can substitute for institutional frameworks.

  • Result: power vacuums filled by mafias, militias, or monopolies.

  • Case Argentina: Milei’s radical deregulation and subsidy cuts in 2024 produced recession and mass poverty before stabilization gains, exemplifying Sargent’s point that utopian shortcuts often yield social harm.


II. Neo-Marxism: the Utopia of the “Perfect State”

Neo-Marxism extends Marx’s class analysis to identity and culture, promising equality across all dimensions. In Popper’s critique, this is historicist utopianism: the belief that history has a predetermined end (a classless or perfectly equal society).

  • Fallacy: presumes social conflict can be eliminated by abolishing inequality.

  • Result: states expand coercion, enforcing conformity in the name of justice.

  • Historical record: USSR, Cuba, and Venezuela demonstrate how utopias of equality degenerated into repression, corruption, and poverty.


III. Hamas: Revolutionary Utopia, Theocratic Dystopia

The radical left often portrays Hamas as a legitimate resistance force. Its 1988 charter, however, explicitly calls for the destruction of Israel through jihad, and even later documents do not revoke this premise.

  • Fallacy: idealizing the oppressed as inherently just.

  • Reality: Hamas enforces religious authoritarianism, represses women and minorities, and wages terror campaigns.

  • Dystopian outcome: internal oppression in Gaza and regional escalation.


IV. The Utopian Fallacy of a “Two-State Solution” Without Hamas’s Neutralization

Calls for a two-state solution are rational in theory, but utopian in practice if Hamas remains intact. Popper warned that utopian blueprints ignore the “piecemeal engineering” needed for workable institutions.

  • Problem: Hamas’s ideological foundation denies Israel’s legitimacy.

  • Risk: Creating a state alongside Israel that is run by an armed, authoritarian militia would institutionalize permanent conflict.

  • Lesson: peace requires dismantling or transforming Hamas first; otherwise, utopia becomes a recipe for endless war.


V. Far-Right Imperial Presidencies: Trump, Putin, Orbán

Popper’s Open Society warns that authoritarian leaders exploit utopian narratives to justify dismantling democratic institutions. This is visible in far-right “imperial presidencies” that concentrate power in the executive.

  • Donald Trump: promotes a utopia of national rebirth through “America First,” portraying himself as the sole savior who can restore greatness. In practice, this weakens checks and balances, undermines electoral trust, and fosters polarization.

  • Vladimir Putin: embodies a nationalist utopia of resurrecting Russian empire, justifying aggression against Ukraine. His regime combines repression, propaganda, and militarism in what Popper would classify as an anti-open-society project.

  • Viktor Orbán: advances “illiberal democracy” in Hungary, a utopia of cultural homogeneity and national sovereignty. Through media control and judicial capture, he erodes pluralism—the essence of the open society.

Common thread: these leaders frame themselves as infallible guardians of national destiny, a utopian fiction that authorizes the erosion of liberal institutions.


VI. Two Extremes, One Pattern

Despite ideological differences, anarcho-capitalism, neo-Marxism, pro-Hamas utopianism, and far-right authoritarian presidencies share three traits:

  1. Naïve perfectionism — belief in a flawless order.

  2. Suppression of pluralism — silencing dissent in the name of unity.

  3. Justification of harm — presenting suffering as a necessary sacrifice for a promised paradise.

Popper’s warning is clear: utopian engineering is dangerous not only in theory but in practice. It justifies tyranny on both extremes.


Conclusion

Utopian thought, whether on the radical left or the far right, is the common root of extremism. From markets without states to states without markets, from revolutionary movements to imperial presidencies, utopias deny human imperfection and institutional limits. The consequence is violence, repression, or systemic breakdown.

The liberal alternative—what Popper called the open society—is more modest but more sustainable: piecemeal reform, pluralism, and institutional checks. It does not promise paradise. It offers gradual improvement within the bounds of human imperfection—and that realism is its greatest strength.


References (APA)

  • Popper, K. (1945). The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge.

  • Sargent, L. T. (2010). Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

  • Reuters. (2024, Sept. 26). Milei’s austerity seen pushing half of Argentina into poverty.

  • Reuters. (2025, Mar. 31). Poverty-hit Argentines rummage for food even as economic outlook improves.

  • Avalon Project. (1988). The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas Charter). Yale Law School.

  • Wilson Center. (2017). The Doctrine of Hamas: New Charter vs. Old Charter.

  • AP News. (2025). Argentina poverty levels slide as Milei tames inflation.


Recent Data and Sources

1. The Hamas Charter and Its Content

Published on August 18, 1988, the Hamas Charter explicitly declares that Israel must disappear, and that Palestine is “an indivisible Islamic unity” that cannot cede any part of its territory, since doing so would amount to treason.

  • Article 2 of the original statute affirms that the struggle against the Zionists is so grave that it admits no negotiation; it demands the “liberation of Palestine” through jihad and rejects any political solution that implies recognizing Israel.

  • Although in 2017 Hamas published new statutes that soften some terms and state acceptance of the 1967 borders, there is no explicit retraction of the fundamental articles of the original charter, nor of the goal of armed resistance.

Relevant interpretation: These texts confirm that Hamas is not only militarily and politically active, but that its ideology does not contemplate recognized coexistence with the State of Israel as it currently exists. This makes a two-state solution unviable unless Hamas first renounces its objective of destruction. That ideological foundation underpins the critique: supporting a two-state solution without requiring the transformation or disarmament of Hamas is to uphold a utopia without regard for the reality of ideology and power structures.


2. Recent Social Indicators in Argentina: Poverty, Indigence, and Childhood

These data reveal the social costs of statist or extreme economic policies and reflect what Sargent warns: abstract utopianisms often produce real suffering.

  • Total poverty: in the second half of 2024, poverty in Argentina stood at 38.1% of the population. This represents a decrease from 52.9% in the first half of 2024.

  • Indigence: in that same period, indigence reached 8.2% of the population (~2.5 million people).

  • Childhood: children under 14 were the most affected—around 51.9% in poverty and 11.5% in indigence.

  • Recent monetary poverty: a UNICEF report for the second half of 2024 placed child monetary poverty at 52.7%, with extreme poverty at around 9.3% according to institutional projections for the first half of 2025.

Relevant interpretation: Although under Milei, there was a notable drop in poverty from the extremes of 2024, the levels remain very high. This shows that economic utopias—whether statist ones that promise universal welfare or hard libertarian ones that promise to improve everything through free markets—face a costly and slow reality that makes transformation difficult, with significant social consequences if changes are abrupt.


3. Victims and Effects of the Israel–Hamas Conflict

To understand what supporting movements like Hamas imply without considering humanitarian consequences, it is essential to look at recent figures:

  • Civilian victims reported in Gaza after Israeli offensives aimed at Hamas military structures: a report cited by Huffington Post (April 2025) indicates more than 52,243 deaths and over 117,639 injured since the major events of October 2023. More than 65% of the victims were women, children, and the elderly.

  • Gaza authorities denounce the deaths of more than 2,200 entire families (each family involving multiple members) and more than 5,070 families with only one survivor.

Notes of nuance:

  • There are questions about the reliability and transparency of some figures, as many come from agencies or authorities under Hamas influence.

  • Nevertheless, reports agree on the magnitude: civilian casualties are extremely high, suggesting that utopian political violence has real, immediate, and atrocious human costs.


How to Incorporate These Data into the Utopian Critique

With these empirical elements, the following arguments are strengthened:

  1. Supporting the two-state theory without demanding the dismantling of the militant apparatus or renunciation of explicit goals of destruction (such as those of Hamas) is a naïve political utopia, as it ignores the incompatibility between Hamas’s founding ideology and peaceful coexistence.

  2. The poverty figures in Argentina show that radical changes—whether statist or extreme libertarian—do not have uniform immediate effects: there are social victims in the most vulnerable sectors, especially children and households in extreme poverty. Utopias that promise unlimited welfare must answer how they will protect these groups during transitions.

  3. The human data of the conflict (civilian casualties) demonstrate that the idealization of resistance or of the oppressed actor can conceal real violence, disproportionate collateral effects, and a constant feedback loop of suffering. This connects to Sargent’s warning: utopianisms that value the purity of the good can tolerate or justify atrocities in the name of their end.







Saturday, June 21, 2025

Moebius: The Shape of Social Failure Cycles The Case of Argentina and the Risk for the United States


By Mariano Bernardez

“The Enlightenment is working.”
— Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now


I. Introduction: Progress as a Straight Path of Reason

Human progress has not been linear, but it has always moved forward when grounded in freedom: freedom to think, learn, and build. Every time these freedoms have been replaced by closed systems — whether ideological, tribal, or authoritarian — the result has been stagnation or conflict.

Authors such as Steven Pinker (Enlightenment Now, The Better Angels of Our Nature), Joel Mokyr (A Culture of Growth), and Angus Maddison (OECD historical data) have shown that the true engine of development is the free accumulation of knowledge, not redistribution or grievance politics.

Yet some societies repeat their failures cyclically. Instead of advancing, they spin in circles, trapped in a Moebius strip: a surface that appears to move but always returns to the same point. Argentina has long been caught in such a cycle. Alarmingly, the United States now seems at risk of entering its own ideological Moebius loop.


II. Moebius: The Geometry of Stagnation

The Moebius strip symbolizes systems that appear to move but never progress. In politics, it reflects tribal polarization that replaces learning with repetition.

This occurs when ideologies frame history as a zero-sum conflict. From Marxist dialectics to Hegelian-Nietzschean narratives of power and identity, these frameworks deny the possibility of rational progress and replace individual agency with collective grievance.

Rather than create value through innovation, such systems encourage the redistribution of existing wealth via political conflict.


III. Argentina: Two Centuries of Moebius

Since 1810, Argentina has cycled through recurring ideological and cultural wars:

  • Unitarians vs. Federalists (1810–1853): Civil wars between enlightened modernizers and authoritarian caudillos paralyzed the country until the 1853 Constitution.

  • Peronists vs. Anti-Peronists (1945–1983): A cultural and institutional war between populism and republicanism led to dictatorship, terrorism, and political exile.

  • Kirchnerists vs. Anti-Kirchnerists (2003–2025): Tribalism returned with a new face: narrative replaced facts, militancy replaced institutions, and the economy was managed as a spoils system.

Progress in Argentina only occurred when these cycles were broken.


IV. The Virtuous Interlude: 1853–1930

Argentina's only sustained era of growth was from 1853 to 1930:

  • According to Angus Maddison, per capita GDP rose from USD 1,311 (1990 PPP) in 1870 to USD 3,797 by 1913, surpassing Italy and approaching Germany.

  • Orlando Ferreres shows an average growth rate of 3.5% per year, alongside booming infrastructure, literacy, and exports.

This was possible because Argentina embraced modern institutions, openness, and forward-looking policies — escaping the Moebius loop, if only briefly.


V. United States: Entering Its Own Moebius?

America has long been the exception — a society founded on Enlightenment principles, meritocracy, and freedom. But today, two polarized forces —MAGA nationalism and woke identitarianism— threaten to turn it into another Argentina.


1. MAGA: The Myth of a Lost Greatness

MAGA ideology is rooted in the idea of restoring a mythical past — ignoring the very diversity and innovation that made America great. It includes:

  • Economic isolationism, echoing 1930s protectionism.

  • Idealization of white, rural, Christian America, excluding the contributions of immigrants and minorities.

  • Attacks on press, institutions, and judicial independence, eroding democratic norms.

MAGA evokes the antebellum South, where privilege resisted industrial and social modernization.


2. Wokism: Grievance as Identity

On the other extreme, woke progressivism frames U.S. history as a chain of oppression, proposing:

  • Cancel culture and historical revisionism as tools of justice.

  • Replacing universal citizenship with tribal entitlements.

  • Redefining justice as reparative symbolism instead of equal opportunity.

This mirrors Mao’s Cultural Revolution, where ideology erased nuance and punished dissent.


3. A New Cultural Civil War?

Both MAGA and woke extremes:

  • Reject reasoned debate.

  • Replace merit with identity.

  • Eliminate shared futures in favor of historical blame.

As Lincoln warned, “A house divided against itself cannot stand.”


4. Reagan’s Principle: Forward, Not Back

In 1981, Ronald Reagan offered a unifying vision:

“It doesn't matter where we came from. What matters is where we're going. If we agree on the destination, the differences become irrelevant.”

This is the antidote to the Moebius trap: not ideological consensus, but a shared commitment to the future.


Conclusion: Breaking the Moebius Cycle

Our core challenge is not right vs. left, but past vs. future.

Societies that learn and build escape the cycle. Those that replay tribal conflicts remain trapped. Argentina shows the cost of repetition. The United States still has time to choose progress.


References

  • Maddison, A. (2007). The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. OECD

  • Mokyr, J. (2016). A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Princeton University Press

  • Pinker, S. (2011). The Better Angels of Our Nature. Viking

  • Pinker, S. (2018). Enlightenment Now. Viking

  • Ferreres, O. (2010). Dos siglos de economía argentina: 1810–2010. El Ateneo

Wednesday, February 26, 2025

The NATO and Russia saga: a long view

 

In his book Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine, Jonathan Haslam critically examines the United States' decision to disregard James Baker's proposal to include post-Soviet Russia in NATO. Haslam argues that this oversight significantly contributed to the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West, ultimately culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

James Baker's Proposal and Its Rationale:

In the early 1990s, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker suggested that NATO consider integrating a democratic Russia into its alliance. Baker believed that including Russia would stabilize the post-Cold War European security landscape and prevent the resurgence of adversarial dynamics. His rationale was that if integrated into Western security structures, Russia would be less likely to revert to authoritarianism or pursue aggressive policies toward its neighbors.

U.S. Decision and Its Consequences:

The U.S. and its European allies expanded NATO eastward despite Baker's foresight, without offering Russia membership or a significant partnership. Haslam contends that this approach fostered a sense of encirclement and resentment within Russia. The exclusion reinforced nationalist sentiments and contributed to a narrative of Western betrayal, which Russian leaders, including Vladimir Putin, later exploited to justify aggressive actions in the region.

Link to the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine:

Haslam posits that the decision to exclude Russia from NATO set the stage for future conflicts. The eastward expansion of NATO, coupled with the lack of integration of Russia into European security frameworks, heightened tensions and mistrust. This adversarial relationship, Haslam argues, was a significant factor leading to Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, as Russia perceived NATO's proximity and influence in neighboring countries as direct threats to its security and sphere of influence.

An even Longer View:

In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia explored the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to integrate into the Western security framework. This initiative was marked by several key events and discussions, particularly during the early 1990s and 2000s.

Early Overtures (1990s):

  • 1991: President Boris Yeltsin expressed Russia's interest in becoming part of NATO. In a letter to NATO, Yeltsin suggested that Russia's long-term aim was to join the alliance, viewing it as a pathway to integrate with Western security structures.

  • 1993: Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker advocated for a plan to include a democratic Russia in NATO, arguing that such inclusion could support Russian democrats and contribute constructively to European security.

Putin's Proposal (Early 2000s):

  • 2000: shortly before his first inauguration as President of Russia, Vladimir Putin indicated a willingness to consider deeper integration with NATO. In an interview, he stated, "We believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner." When asked about the possibility of Russia joining NATO, he responded, "I do not see why not."

  • 2000: In a meeting with NATO Secretary General George Robertson, Putin inquired about the prospects of Russia joining NATO. Robertson recounted that Putin asked, "When will you invite us to join NATO?" This question underscored Putin's interest in aligning Russia with Western security structures.

Challenges and Divergence:

Despite these overtures, several factors contributed to the failure of Russia's integration into NATO:

  • Perception of Inequality: Russia sought to join NATO as an equal partner, desiring a status that reflected its view of itself as a great power. The standard application process, which required prospective members to meet specific political and military criteria, was seen by Russian leadership as diminishing Russia's stature.

  • NATO's Expansion: The eastward expansion of NATO during the late 1990s and early 2000s, incorporating former Warsaw Pact countries and Baltic states, was perceived by Russia as a strategic encroachment into its sphere of influence. This expansion fostered a sense of encirclement and mistrust towards NATO's intentions.

  • Geopolitical Tensions: Incidents such as NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 without United Nations Security Council authorization exacerbated Russia's skepticism towards NATO. Russia viewed these actions as undermining international law and sidelining Russian influence in global security matters.

Escalation to Confrontation:

The divergence between Russia and NATO culminated in heightened tensions, particularly concerning Ukraine:

  • 2008: At the NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members. Russia vehemently opposed this declaration, viewing it as a direct threat to its strategic interests and regional influence.

  • 2014: Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine marked a significant escalation in Russia-NATO relations. These actions were condemned by NATO and led to the suspension of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

  • 2022: Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, citing, among other reasons, concerns over NATO's potential expansion into Ukraine. This invasion resulted in widespread international condemnation, the imposition of severe economic sanctions on Russia, and a bolstering of NATO's presence in Eastern Europe.

In summary, while there were initial discussions and interest from Russia regarding NATO membership, differing expectations, mutual suspicions, and conflicting geopolitical interests ultimately led to deteriorating relations. This adversarial dynamic significantly contributed to the confrontation over Ukraine, culminating in the 2022 invasion.

James Baker's Forgotten Foresight.

In December 1993, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker proposed the inclusion of a democratic Russia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, Baker argued that NATO should develop a plan to incorporate Russia as a full member. He believed this move would support Russian democrats and enable Russia to play a constructive role in European security. Baker's rationale was that integrating Russia into NATO would help stabilize the region and foster cooperation between Russia and Western nations.

This proposal came when Russia underwent significant political and economic transformations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Baker viewed NATO membership as a means to anchor Russia within the Western security architecture, thereby reducing the potential for future conflicts and promoting democratic reforms within Russia.

However, despite such proposals, Russia did not become a NATO member. Various factors, including mutual suspicions, differing expectations, and geopolitical tensions, contributed to the complex relationship between Russia and NATO in the subsequent decades.

Jonathan Haslam's Expertise:

Jonathan Haslam is a distinguished historian specializing in the history of international relations, particularly concerning the Soviet Union and Russia. He has served as the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is Professor Emeritus in the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge. Haslam has authored numerous works on Soviet and Russian foreign policy, including Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall and Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. His extensive research and expertise provide a comprehensive perspective on the complexities of U.S.-Russia relations and the historical contexts leading up to contemporary conflicts.

Bibliography:

  • Haslam, J. (2024). Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine. Bloomsbury Publishing.

  • Haslam, J. (2011). Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall. Yale University Press.

  • Haslam, J. (2015). Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Sunday, February 9, 2025

Trump 2.0: There is madness in his method

 

We're back, but better? (as the Kirchner’s slogan in Argentina’s 2019 election said)

Among the many similarities between Trump and Argentine Peronism-Kirchnerism (and Bolivarian nationalisms) are the use of populist myths such as isolationism and cultural vendettas (in addition to the cult of personality of the leader who fights against one or several external enemies and his internal "traitors").

If, in Trump’s first turn, his critics underestimated the method in its apparent madness (as Shakespeare's Polonius suspecting -late- of Hamlet's feigned insanity) and failed to see the skillful social media strategy and detection of social resentments behind the cascade of popular lies - Obama the black African and closet Muslim, Latino immigrants and blacks as beneficiaries of asylums, "sanctuary cities" and raising the cost of Medicare with Obamacare - and nationalist slogans - such as MAGA, isolationism, and deportations, in his second season in the White House they would be ignoring the other side of Trumpism: the madness behind his methods.

The tariff war, the delirious threats of annexation of Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal, and the conversion of Gaza into a Mediterranean Riviera operated by Trump himself as a savior real estate business speak loudly of the Napoleonic drunkenness behind the methods of the ineffable Donald and his reality show management in front of cameras (it is inevitable to remember the "Hello President" of the late Hugo Chavez). If the first Trump was successful with his taxes, then the first Trump was successful with his taxes. cuts and deregulation in lowering the price of gasoline - the sensitive guts of the Trumpist bastions that move around in trucks and pickups - and with his symbolic threat of raising a wall with Mexico, the second shows that the loss of control of the successful gambler dominates the negotiating calculation.

Now, the cascade of threats and pompous executive orders show another edge of Shakespearian drama, such as "the sound and the fury of the madman signifying nothing" (apart from the pleasure of kamikaze revenge). 

Trump 2.0 switches Shakespeare's plays. The new administration is sliding dangerously from Hamlet's revenge to Macbeth's folly and defeat, advised by schemers and sycophants. The new cast has old faces: - charlatans like Steven Bannon, the leader of populist nationalism (which Trump discarded in his first term), monomaniacs like Stephen Miller, the leader of the xenophobic wing and that version of Henry Ford of the 21st century that Elon Musk has become.

Trump keeps swinging his wrecking ball for the cameras, breaking down pillars of local and global order. He seems oblivious to the wobbly roof over his head (the inevitable response of lawsuits and reprisals paralysis it will generate) or to his floor—the inflation and financial runs that the tariff war promises on the domestic front.

Fretting after the latest developments, Wall Street is already raising red flags, and if inflation takes off, Trump's most loyal voters will have front-row seats to feel the impact.

Milei - who is as bold as Trump but better prepared in economics - coined a caveat to those who call him crazy, saying that the only difference between a madman and a genius is the results.

Trump considers himself a genius - like Milei - but his inflated ego resembles Hindenburg's dangerous equivalent.

Let's hope it reacts before crashing into the many moorings it will need.

Perhaps the best pantomime of a tariff war was immortalized by Laurel & Hardy in 1929, on the eve of another outbreak of madness in apparently rational methods.