Wednesday, February 26, 2025

The NATO and Russia saga: a long view

 

In his book Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine, Jonathan Haslam critically examines the United States' decision to disregard James Baker's proposal to include post-Soviet Russia in NATO. Haslam argues that this oversight significantly contributed to the deteriorating relationship between Russia and the West, ultimately culminating in Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

James Baker's Proposal and Its Rationale:

In the early 1990s, then-U.S. Secretary of State James Baker suggested that NATO consider integrating a democratic Russia into its alliance. Baker believed that including Russia would stabilize the post-Cold War European security landscape and prevent the resurgence of adversarial dynamics. His rationale was that if integrated into Western security structures, Russia would be less likely to revert to authoritarianism or pursue aggressive policies toward its neighbors.

U.S. Decision and Its Consequences:

The U.S. and its European allies expanded NATO eastward despite Baker's foresight, without offering Russia membership or a significant partnership. Haslam contends that this approach fostered a sense of encirclement and resentment within Russia. The exclusion reinforced nationalist sentiments and contributed to a narrative of Western betrayal, which Russian leaders, including Vladimir Putin, later exploited to justify aggressive actions in the region.

Link to the 2022 Invasion of Ukraine:

Haslam posits that the decision to exclude Russia from NATO set the stage for future conflicts. The eastward expansion of NATO, coupled with the lack of integration of Russia into European security frameworks, heightened tensions and mistrust. This adversarial relationship, Haslam argues, was a significant factor leading to Russia's decision to invade Ukraine in 2022, as Russia perceived NATO's proximity and influence in neighboring countries as direct threats to its security and sphere of influence.

An even Longer View:

In the years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia explored the possibility of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to integrate into the Western security framework. This initiative was marked by several key events and discussions, particularly during the early 1990s and 2000s.

Early Overtures (1990s):

  • 1991: President Boris Yeltsin expressed Russia's interest in becoming part of NATO. In a letter to NATO, Yeltsin suggested that Russia's long-term aim was to join the alliance, viewing it as a pathway to integrate with Western security structures.

  • 1993: Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker advocated for a plan to include a democratic Russia in NATO, arguing that such inclusion could support Russian democrats and contribute constructively to European security.

Putin's Proposal (Early 2000s):

  • 2000: shortly before his first inauguration as President of Russia, Vladimir Putin indicated a willingness to consider deeper integration with NATO. In an interview, he stated, "We believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if Russia is regarded as an equal partner." When asked about the possibility of Russia joining NATO, he responded, "I do not see why not."

  • 2000: In a meeting with NATO Secretary General George Robertson, Putin inquired about the prospects of Russia joining NATO. Robertson recounted that Putin asked, "When will you invite us to join NATO?" This question underscored Putin's interest in aligning Russia with Western security structures.

Challenges and Divergence:

Despite these overtures, several factors contributed to the failure of Russia's integration into NATO:

  • Perception of Inequality: Russia sought to join NATO as an equal partner, desiring a status that reflected its view of itself as a great power. The standard application process, which required prospective members to meet specific political and military criteria, was seen by Russian leadership as diminishing Russia's stature.

  • NATO's Expansion: The eastward expansion of NATO during the late 1990s and early 2000s, incorporating former Warsaw Pact countries and Baltic states, was perceived by Russia as a strategic encroachment into its sphere of influence. This expansion fostered a sense of encirclement and mistrust towards NATO's intentions.

  • Geopolitical Tensions: Incidents such as NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 without United Nations Security Council authorization exacerbated Russia's skepticism towards NATO. Russia viewed these actions as undermining international law and sidelining Russian influence in global security matters.

Escalation to Confrontation:

The divergence between Russia and NATO culminated in heightened tensions, particularly concerning Ukraine:

  • 2008: At the NATO summit in Bucharest, the alliance declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members. Russia vehemently opposed this declaration, viewing it as a direct threat to its strategic interests and regional influence.

  • 2014: Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine marked a significant escalation in Russia-NATO relations. These actions were condemned by NATO and led to the suspension of practical cooperation between NATO and Russia.

  • 2022: Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, citing, among other reasons, concerns over NATO's potential expansion into Ukraine. This invasion resulted in widespread international condemnation, the imposition of severe economic sanctions on Russia, and a bolstering of NATO's presence in Eastern Europe.

In summary, while there were initial discussions and interest from Russia regarding NATO membership, differing expectations, mutual suspicions, and conflicting geopolitical interests ultimately led to deteriorating relations. This adversarial dynamic significantly contributed to the confrontation over Ukraine, culminating in the 2022 invasion.

James Baker's Forgotten Foresight.

In December 1993, former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker proposed the inclusion of a democratic Russia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times, Baker argued that NATO should develop a plan to incorporate Russia as a full member. He believed this move would support Russian democrats and enable Russia to play a constructive role in European security. Baker's rationale was that integrating Russia into NATO would help stabilize the region and foster cooperation between Russia and Western nations.

This proposal came when Russia underwent significant political and economic transformations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Baker viewed NATO membership as a means to anchor Russia within the Western security architecture, thereby reducing the potential for future conflicts and promoting democratic reforms within Russia.

However, despite such proposals, Russia did not become a NATO member. Various factors, including mutual suspicions, differing expectations, and geopolitical tensions, contributed to the complex relationship between Russia and NATO in the subsequent decades.

Jonathan Haslam's Expertise:

Jonathan Haslam is a distinguished historian specializing in the history of international relations, particularly concerning the Soviet Union and Russia. He has served as the George F. Kennan Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. He is Professor Emeritus in the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge. Haslam has authored numerous works on Soviet and Russian foreign policy, including Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall and Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. His extensive research and expertise provide a comprehensive perspective on the complexities of U.S.-Russia relations and the historical contexts leading up to contemporary conflicts.

Bibliography:

  • Haslam, J. (2024). Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine. Bloomsbury Publishing.

  • Haslam, J. (2011). Russia's Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall. Yale University Press.

  • Haslam, J. (2015). Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Sunday, February 9, 2025

Trump 2.0: There is madness in his method

 

We're back, but better? (as the Kirchner’s slogan in Argentina’s 2019 election said)

Among the many similarities between Trump and Argentine Peronism-Kirchnerism (and Bolivarian nationalisms) are the use of populist myths such as isolationism and cultural vendettas (in addition to the cult of personality of the leader who fights against one or several external enemies and his internal "traitors").

If, in Trump’s first turn, his critics underestimated the method in its apparent madness (as Shakespeare's Polonius suspecting -late- of Hamlet's feigned insanity) and failed to see the skillful social media strategy and detection of social resentments behind the cascade of popular lies - Obama the black African and closet Muslim, Latino immigrants and blacks as beneficiaries of asylums, "sanctuary cities" and raising the cost of Medicare with Obamacare - and nationalist slogans - such as MAGA, isolationism, and deportations, in his second season in the White House they would be ignoring the other side of Trumpism: the madness behind his methods.

The tariff war, the delirious threats of annexation of Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal, and the conversion of Gaza into a Mediterranean Riviera operated by Trump himself as a savior real estate business speak loudly of the Napoleonic drunkenness behind the methods of the ineffable Donald and his reality show management in front of cameras (it is inevitable to remember the "Hello President" of the late Hugo Chavez). If the first Trump was successful with his taxes, then the first Trump was successful with his taxes. cuts and deregulation in lowering the price of gasoline - the sensitive guts of the Trumpist bastions that move around in trucks and pickups - and with his symbolic threat of raising a wall with Mexico, the second shows that the loss of control of the successful gambler dominates the negotiating calculation.

Now, the cascade of threats and pompous executive orders show another edge of Shakespearian drama, such as "the sound and the fury of the madman signifying nothing" (apart from the pleasure of kamikaze revenge). 

Trump 2.0 switches Shakespeare's plays. The new administration is sliding dangerously from Hamlet's revenge to Macbeth's folly and defeat, advised by schemers and sycophants. The new cast has old faces: - charlatans like Steven Bannon, the leader of populist nationalism (which Trump discarded in his first term), monomaniacs like Stephen Miller, the leader of the xenophobic wing and that version of Henry Ford of the 21st century that Elon Musk has become.

Trump keeps swinging his wrecking ball for the cameras, breaking down pillars of local and global order. He seems oblivious to the wobbly roof over his head (the inevitable response of lawsuits and reprisals paralysis it will generate) or to his floor—the inflation and financial runs that the tariff war promises on the domestic front.

Fretting after the latest developments, Wall Street is already raising red flags, and if inflation takes off, Trump's most loyal voters will have front-row seats to feel the impact.

Milei - who is as bold as Trump but better prepared in economics - coined a caveat to those who call him crazy, saying that the only difference between a madman and a genius is the results.

Trump considers himself a genius - like Milei - but his inflated ego resembles Hindenburg's dangerous equivalent.

Let's hope it reacts before crashing into the many moorings it will need.

Perhaps the best pantomime of a tariff war was immortalized by Laurel & Hardy in 1929, on the eve of another outbreak of madness in apparently rational methods.