Argentina's "Disappeared": 30.000 or 8.960?

Testimony of Graciela Fernandez Meijide, mother of a "desaparecido" and member of CONADEP

“Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past.”

― George Orwell, 1984

The political use of human rights became evident for Argentinians in the rally organized yesterday, March 24, 2023, by a  pro-government group called La Campora, led by the son of former president and current vice president Cristina Kirchner. 

Under the guise of an anniversary of the military coup of March 24, 1976,  that installed a Military Junta and pursued crimes against humanity judged in 1985 (recently presented in an Oscar-nominated film), the rally pressed to stop the verdicts in trials for the corruption of Cristina Kirchner excluded all opposition parties and independent organizations organized. 

The rally organizers proclaimed a bogus version of 30,000 disappeared during the military dictatorship years (1976-1983) and accused those who supported the 8,960 tested by CONADEP of "denialism." 

We carefully researched the arguments for and against both positions with an exhaustive search using artificial intelligence (ChatGPT 4). 

Here are the results: 

The figure of 8,960 disappeared in Argentina during the 1976-1983 dictatorship comes from a report, "Nunca Más," prepared by the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) 1984. Then-President Raúl Alfonsín created CONADEP to investigate and document the human rights violations committed by the military government.

Sources and arguments in favor of the figure of 8,960:

1.     The "Nunca Más" report results from an extensive investigative process carried out by CONADEP, which included the collection of testimonies, documents, and evidence of human rights violations.

2.     CONADEP not only documented cases of forced disappearance but also cases of torture, murder, and theft of babies. Therefore, the figure of 8,960 is a solid number based on data collected and verified by the commission.

3.     The figure of 8,960 is widely accepted and supported by international organizations and human rights experts, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Arguments for the figure of 30,000:

1.     The 30,000 figure is often cited by human rights organizations and groups of relatives of victims, such as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, who argue that the number of disappeared is much higher due to the number of cases not reported or documented.

2.     The 30,000 figure is argued to be based on estimates and testimonies from survivors and relatives of the victims, who claim that many people were kidnapped, tortured, and killed without a trace.

3.     Some argue that the "Nunca Más" report could not include all cases due to a lack of resources and time, as well as possible intimidation of witnesses and survivors by members of the military government.

Critical analysis :

1.     CONADEP's figure of 8,960 is supported by exhaustive and systematic research. However, it is important to recognize that the political and social context at the time may have limited the commission's ability to document all cases.

2.     The 30,000 figure, while widely reported and cited, lacks the same empirical basis as the 8,960 figure. It can help raise awareness of the magnitude of violence and human rights violations. Still, it should be treated with caution when approaching the issue from an academic or legal perspective.

3.     The political and economic motivations behind each figure can be diverse. While the 8,960 figure can be seen as an attempt to document and acknowledge human rights violations officially, the 30,000 figure can be used by interest groups to highlight the seriousness of the problem and press for justice and redress.

The reasons why CONADEP's figure of 8,960 disappeared is considered correct are based on the methodology used, the exhaustiveness of the investigation, and the support of international organizations and human rights experts. Here are the reasons _ _ main :

1.     Research methodology: CONADEP carried out a rigorous and systematic research process. The commission collected testimonies, documents, and evidence of human rights violations, including forced disappearances, torture, murder, and theft of babies. The figure of 8,960 is based on these verified and documented data in the "Nunca Más" report (Source: "Nunca Más" report, CONADEP, 1984).

2.     Official recognition The report "Nunca Más" was published by a commission created by then President Raúl Alfonsín, which gives it an official and governmental character. The figure of 8,960 is the official recognition of the forced disappearances during the dictatorship (Source: Decree 187/83, Presidency of the Argentine Nation, 1983).

3.     Supported by international organizations and experts: The figure of 8,960 is widely accepted and supported by international human rights organizations and experts in the field, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These organizations have cited and used the figure of 8,960 in their reports and analyses of the human rights situation in Argentina during the dictatorship (Source: Amnesty International, "Argentina: A Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, "2000; Human Rights Watch, " World Report 2001: Argentina").

4.     The thoroughness of investigation: Although the "Nunca Más" report may not have been able to include all cases of enforced disappearances, the figure of 8,960 is the result of a comprehensive effort to document and verify as many cases as possible. CONADEP identified and denounced human rights violations, providing a solid foundation for future investigations and justice efforts (Source: "Nunca Más" report, CONADEP, 1984).

Considering these reasons, the figure of 8,960 disappeared persons presented by CONADEP is considered correct from a methodological, official point of view and supported by international organizations and human rights experts.

 

Luis Labraña, a journalist and former Montonero militant, has stated in interviews that 30,000 disappeared was an invention on his part during the dictatorship. According to Labraña, the figure was created in 1978, when he worked at the ANCLA news agency, founded by Rodolfo Walsh, a writer, and journalist who disappeared during the dictatorship. Labraña maintains that the figure was created to attract the attention of the international press and that it had no real foundations.

Labraña mentions that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo adopted the figure of 30,000 disappeared and used it in their protests and activities. Over the years, various sectors in Argentina and abroad widely disseminated and accepted the figure.

It should be noted that Labraña's testimony is an individual perspective and does not necessarily represent the reality of how the figure of 30,000 disappeared originated. Despite their claims, CONADEP, as we mentioned above, documented 8,960 cases of forced disappearances, this being the official figure and supported by various international organizations and human rights experts.

Sources:

• Perfil, "Luis Labraña, the journalist who invented the 30,000 disappeared", 2016.
• Infobae, "The militant who recognized that he invented the figure of 30,000 disappeared", 2016.

Maintaining a critical and analytical vision of the statements and testimonies presented concerning complex and sensitive historical events, such as the forced disappearances in Argentina during the dictatorship, is essential to keep political use at bay. 

Although Labraña's testimony is interesting, it is crucial to consider official and documented information when addressing this issue.

 

Antebellum II: Is Trumpism the start for a second civil war in the US?

For those societies that have experienced them, the danger of civil wars is not just a hypothetical but a menacing specter of their actual past. Survivors of past civil wars (like most African and European countries and a significant number of Asians) are haunted by their memories. So might be those who read History and books such as Barbara Walter's How Civil Wars Start and How To Prevent Them.

The central argument of How Civil Wars Start and How To Prevent Them is that in a spectrum of political systems that go from total tyranny (-10 on Walter's scale) and stable, strong al well-functioning liberal democracy (+10), Civil Wars tend to happen in those Walter call "emocracies" -somewhere between -5 and +5 of that scale.

In her study of multiple civil war cases -from Ancient times to Kosovo and Rwanda, Iraq or Afghanistan- Walter   found two common elements:

1. Identity politics pit one ethnic/cultural group against another -usually the "son of the land" against immigrants or perceived "elite" groups in power. ("critical race" theory on the Far Left and 'ethnic replacement" on the Far Right mirror the same populist argument to fuel hatred and distrust.
2. Replacement of the current republic: The idea that if the rival win will mean the destruction of the US constitution and descent into some form of dictatorship with massive loss of rights for the losing faction.
3. Formal secession (and ethnic 'cleansing") of the two factions.

The United States under Trump descended from an 8 to a dangerous 5 in the civil war risk "zone" during Trump's first term (so far) to return to 7 after Trump's contentious defeat in 2020. (At least for 25/30%  of hard-core Trumpists and the majority of mainstream republican voters that get their information from Tucker Carlson and other conspiratory hacks) 

Critical Review

Walter's study has many eye-opening points of contact with the current crises in EU  and  US liberal democracies with several important caveats:

1. It's a mid-term scenario for the US. Institutions are still able to contain dictatorial takeovers -as the June 6 hearings and the Republican Party business establishment's reluctance to go with Trump's anti-globalization policies. It would take more than a small mob storming the Capitol to bring down 248-year-old and tested constitutional institutions installing a Putin- Xi or a new version of Jefferson Davis.
2. It downplays and neglects the analysis of the illiberal Left in promoting civil wars  -from BLM, Antifa, and the Quad- to the illiberal 'woke' left identity politics that drive the 2022 Democratic party presided by fading octogenarian leadership (COTUS and POTUS) without moderate and government-tested succession line.
3. It underestimates the historical size and power of the mainstream center in the US that rejects both extremes that demand sensible politics that address inflation growth and security.

The most recent historical precedent in the US would be president Andrew Jackson's failed challenge to COTUS and censure in 1837 President Trump kept a portrait of Jackson in his office.

Recommended Readings Review: Six Faces of Globalization: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why It Matters by; Anthea Roberts, Nicolas Lamp

 

 

The 6 perspectives "Rubik" model

The book proposes a clever, innovative, multi-perspective model to understand and analyze more than globalization itself, the politics, and political reactions to it.

The authors do not take sides but offer what can be a useful tool to foresee and even negotiate policies beyond politics that address the impacts and unintended consequences of globalization processes and their ups and downturns.

It is a good complement to my "cat whiskers' analysis methodology.

Here I quote their main theses for the sake of brevity:

1. "The Top Face of the Cube: Everybody Wins

 

According to some economists, if you think that globalization impoverishes countries and destroys communities, you have it all wrong. Sure, you may have lost your job because workers. 

in other countries are paid less, but that is not at all different from losing your job because workers in the factory next door are more efficient or because technological progress has rendered your skills obsolete. The market is simply doing its work. You should improve your qualifications to get a better job; in the meantime, you still benefit from globalization since it gives you access to cheaper products. The process of adjustment may be hard at times, but it is a short- term cost that we have to accept in the interest of long- term prosperity. The end result will be a more efficient economy, lower prices, and more abundant consumer choice. In this view, the pushback against economic globalization by people who feel that they have lost out is simply a natural reaction to the creative destruction cycles.

We call this “everybody wins” view the establishment narrative, because it was the dominant paradigm for understanding economic globalization in the West in the three decades following the end of the Cold War. The view reflected a consensus of the main political parties in most Western democracies and beyond, and it has been espoused by many of the institutions that serve as the guardians of the international economic order, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the WTO. Many powerful actors still endorse this narrative, arguing that free trade not only increases prosperity but also supports other goals, such as promoting peace. Since the establishment narrative has been ruling the world and also represents the sunniest view of globalization, we visualize it as situated on the top of the cube.

The Four Sides of the Cube: Winners and Losers 

"The establishment narrative now finds itself besieged from all sides. Concerns about the impact of free trade on workers and the environment have bubbled up previously, but discontent with economic globalization tended to be suppressed in mainstream circles in the West. In the decade following the global financial crisis, however, narratives that highlight how economic globalization produces both winners and losers have returned to the center of political debate. These currents have pushed us off the sunny top of the cube, over the edges, and down to the four faces on the cube’s sides (Figure 1.2). Instead of relatively limited squabbles between the center- left and center- right 

Proponents of the four challenger narratives do not necessarily contest that economic globalization has produced absolute economic gains at the aggregate level, whether measured nationally or globally. However, they focus on the distribution of those gains, both within and across countries, and derive much of their energy from channeling the disappointment, fears, and anger of the losers. 

2. On the left of the political spectrum, we see two narratives that emphasize how gains from economic globalization have flowed upward to rich individuals and multinational corporations. The left- wing populist narrative focuses on the ways in which national economies are rigged to channel the gains from globalization to the privileged few. 

Left- wing populism expresses itself in vertical hostility; its proponents stand up for the ordinary people who have lost out to the corrupt elite. 

Whereas some proponents point the finger at chief executive officers (CEOs), bankers, and billionaires (the top 1 percent), others take aim at the educated professional class and the upper middle class more broadly (the top 20 percent). 

Instead of singling out domestic elites, proponents of the corporate power narrative argue that the real winners from economic globalization are multinational corporations, which can take advantage of a global marketplace to produce cheaply, sell everywhere, and pay as little in taxes as possible. 

The left-wing populist narrative zeroes in on domestic problems, highlighting the explosion of inequality within countries. 

The corporate power narrative, by contrast, adopts a transnational approach and treats multinational corporations and the transnational working class as the key actors. 

The two narratives are often intertwined in places such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where many on the left are broadly critical of owners of substantial capital, whether individual or corporate. 

In many western European countries, by contrast, where levels of domestic inequality are lower, the corporate power narrative features more prominently, as was evident in the protests across Europe in 2015 and 2016 against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). 

3. In the right- wing populist narrative, workers, their families, and their communities lose from globalization, both economically and in a cultural sense. 

This narrative’s emphasis varies in different countries. In the United States, where the loss of blue- collar jobs to China and Mexico has devastated manufacturing communities, the narrative has a strong anti- trade element. 

In western Europe, anti- immigrant sentiment and concerns about a loss of sovereignty are central features of the narrative, whereas anxieties about the impact of international trade are less pronounced. 

In the United Kingdom, for instance, many of those who voted for Brexit did not oppose free trade; they rebelled against what they perceived as dictates from the EU institutions in Brussels and longed to regain control over immigration. 

The right-wing populist narrative shares with the left-wing version a deep distrust of elites, but the two narratives part company on what they blame the elite for. 

 

whereas left- wing populists fault the elite for enriching themselves at the expense of the working and middle classes, right- wing populists denounce the elite for failing to protect the hardworking native population from threats posed by an external “other.” 

The right- wing populist narrative thus has a strong horizontal us- versus- them quality, whether expressed through concern about protecting workers from the offshoring of jobs or guarding them against an inflow of immigrants who might compete for those jobs, live off the welfare system, or threaten the native community’s sense of identity. 

The right- wing populist narrative also highlights geographical divisions within countries, such as the diverging fortunes of thriving cities 

The geoeconomic narrative also focuses on an external threat, but of a different kind: it emphasizes economic and technological competition between the United States and China as great- power rivals. 

Although the narrative features most prominently in America, it is gaining ground in other Western countries as well, where China is increasingly regarded as a strategic competitor and a potential security threat rather than merely as an economic partner. Instead of applauding trade and investment as enhancing economic welfare and increasing prospects for peace, the geoeconomic narrative emphasizes the security vulnerabilities created by economic interdependence and digital connectivity with a strategic rival.

Although both the right- wing populist and geoeconomic narratives emphasize external, horizontal threats, they differ in key ways. 

The former focuses on cultural as well as economic losses, while the latter is more mindful of relative economic power of countries and its capacity to undergird political and military power.
 
The former primarily laments the loss of the manufacturing jobs of the past, while the latter focuses on winning the race in the technologies of the future, such as fifth- generation (5G) networks and artificial intelligence.
 

And the former targets Polish plumbers who undercut local workers, whereas the latter casts a critical eye on Chinese scientists and engineers who might steal Western technology.

4. The Bottom Face of the Cube: Everybody Loses

 

"on the bottom face of the Rubik’s cube, we locate narratives that see all of us as at risk of losing from economic globalization in its current form. These narratives portray economic globalization as a source and accelerator of global threats, such as pandemics and climate change. 

Some of these narratives focus on how global connectivity increases the risk of contagion, both of the viral and economic kind. 

 Others warn that the skyrocketing carbon emissions associated with the global diffusion of Western patterns of production and consumption are endangering both people and the planet.

Interesting comments and debate

  

Get the book

My Review of Six Faces of Globalization

 

The Rubik analogy is a rich and thought-provoking framework to "frame" political and social reactions toward globalization. The book presents five reactions to the "mainstream" idea of globalization as "faces" or "sides" of the Rubik cube. The Rubik analogy frames the analysis within certain constraints or pre-condition that can help or hinder the search for practical problem-solving alternatives:

1.       There is no one "optimal" "win-win" but 6ⁿ possible options. The Rubik model presents the non-zero-sum, "win-win" option as "the establishment narrative" (two popular populist derogatory terms) and "the dominant paradigm" (another). To find a "win-win" option within the tangled Rubik model, all other facets must be fulfilled on their terms -whether they might be objectively correct or wrong, feasible or not. Everybody has to be happy to find a happy ending, or at least, the problem-solver has to conciliate six positions at politically, ideologically, and socially odds with each other.

2.      All six facets are presented antagonistically, which defeats the purpose of the Rubik model, which has multiple collaborative solutions to "fill" the six desired sides' optimal" (no facet can have "mixed" or blended elements).

A         All six "facets" in the Rubik model are political and ideological "narratives", not objective country/ industry ./ social segment, region objective P&L data

3.      There is a "lose-lose" mandatory option to solve all other five, and Rubik's simplistic logic does not have a 'losing side."

The Rubik analogy is academically and visually attractive but intrinsically drives to endless unsustainable "solutions" unless there is an optimal "win-win," non=zero-sum alternative.

Such an alternative requires "mixing" elements of each side

And also to have a "guiding star": a solution that is not "a side" but a multi-dimensional "win-win" optimal, like the Prisoners' Dilemma.

How about a Minimal Ideal Vision (MIV) for a shared, sustainable human future?

That goes beyond quick fix diplomacy and appeasement. We got one in 1945-48 after two World wars. And a third, with the fall of the USSR.

We must find a new MIV or get entangled in an unsolvable, unstable mess of a self-made maze.

Smart Debates: The Populist reaction against Liberal progress

  

On February 18th, 2019, Intelligence Squared brought together a panel of experts to argue the causes behind the rise of populism and to debate what should happen next. Should mainstream parties adopt the policies of the populists in an attempt to appeal to people who have hitherto felt unheard? Or should liberals refuse to abandon principled and economically necessary immigration policies? Hear the arguments and have your say.They are today even more valid than then.

Check the Source

The three stages of populism: institutional degradation, popular dictatorship, imperialist expansion

The term populism (or populist) has become a placeholder for a growing gamut of extreme politics. Let's look at some common components of populism and its stages of evolution.

Definitions 

Merriam-Webster

Definition of populist

 (Entr

y 1 of 2)

1: a member of a political party claiming to represent the common peopleespecially, often capitalized: a member of a U.S. political party formed in 1891 primarily to represent agrarian interests and to advocate the free coinage of silver and government control of monopolies

2: a believer in the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people

Brittanica

populism is a political program or movement that champions, or claims to champion, the common person, usually by favorable contrast with a real or perceived elite or establishment.

Populism usually combines elements of the left and the right, opposing large business and financial interests but also frequently being hostile to established liberal, socialist, and labor parties.

The term populism can designate either democratic or authoritarian movements. Populism is typically critical of political representation and anything that mediates the relation between the people and their leader or government. In its most democratic form, populism seeks to defend the interests and maximize the power of ordinary citizens, through reform rather than revolution

Political Science (Francis Fukuyama) 

 

 Common characteristics:

1. "Anti-Elitism": Politics that blame the situation of a group -usually considered a majority of low and middle income "native" working class- on the policies and privileges of "elites" or minorities with un-earned access to wealth, property, power, or education, including foreigners, immigrants and ethnic or religious groups (Jews, Arabs, White, Men, European)  or industries (Finance and banking, oil, Technology) and places (rural, small towns vs, big cities, high-end vs poor neighborhoods and slums)
2. Zero-sum, victimization logic: the "gains" and superior wealth, status, and access to education of "the elites" is taken away from "the people" by an unfair system. 
3. Group and class antagonistic and unresolvable (by institutional and peaceful means) conflict there is no "middle ground" or 'melting pot" but segregation, expulsion, or warfare among classes, ethnic groups, locals vs foreigners.
4. Protectionism, nationalism
5. Secessionism, autonomism, separatism
6. Isolationism, anti-"cosmopolitanism"
7. Xenophobia and "kin-based" trust (and distrust)
8. Extreme conspirative views shared in "communication bubbles" with highly exclusive beliefs and even language and behavioral codes
9. Highly emotional, passion-based motivations (mostly rage)
10. Self-reinforcing, partisan politics
11. Distrust in liberal institutions and rule of law
12. Strong leaders totally empowered by  faithful followers
13. Avoidance of "unpopular" positions. "The people" are always right.
14. Use of direct and circumstantial majorities: rule by the crowd, rally, street, referendums.

Evolution and Stages

1. Institutional degradation

Populist politics and policies erode those institutions designed to check and balance power. They usually start by defacing and storming the Congress -as in the cases of 19717 Russia, 1924 Italy, 1932 Germany, 2003 Venezuela, 2020 US, and 2022 Chile.

Soon Congress's compromise and legislation are replaced by referendum and special executive orders justified by some kind of "national emergency".

      2. Popular Dictatorship

Contrary to conventional wisdom, dictators most often are popularly elected; Mussolini and Hitler reached office by vote and were reelected by 90% of the popular vote. Chavez, Maduro, and Putin stayed decades in power through elections. 

Populist leaders "elect" their voters in exchange for benefits. Patronage, fraud, and opposition illegalization make indefinite reelections safe. Nepotism and dynastic succession secure power beyond life terms.

Common policies:

1. Protectionism
2. Clientelism & patronage
3. Anti-free market capitalism
4. State and crony capitalism

   3. Imperialist Expansion

The constant depletion of wealth and resources to sustain corruption and clientelism requires continuous expansion -"Lebensraum" - Hitler's term for our modern "secure borders". Hitler's annexation of Sudetes and Putin's of Crimea follows that same pattern. Hitler's outright invasion of Poland (with Stalin's help) and Putin's invasion of Ukraine show the same type of escalation.

In its imperial expansionist phase, populist dictatorships provoke territorial wars culminating in global conflicts until their regimes are destroyed with large devastation and loss of lives.

Recommended readings: Liberalism and its discontents by Francis Fukuyama

In his book "Liberalism and its discontents", Francis Fukuyama revisits critically his earlier views of "The End of History" and makes new observations about the status of liberal democracy twenty years into the 21st century. 

Fukuyama starts by defining liberalism in the widest possible way:

By “liberalism,” I refer to the doctrine that first emerged in the second half of the seventeenth century that argued for the limitation of the powers of governments through law and ultimately constitutions, creating institutions protecting the rights of individuals living under their jurisdiction. 

Classical liberalism is a big tent that encompasses a range of political views that nonetheless agree on the foundational importance of equal individual rights, law, and freedom.  

And makes a clear distinction with plain democracy: 

Democracy refers to rule by the people, which today is institutionalized in periodic free and fair multiparty elections under universal adult suffrage. 

Liberalism in the sense I am using it refers to the rule of law, a system of formal rules that restrict the powers of the executive, even if that executive is democratically legitimated through an election.

He finds that, after a triumphant expansion after the fall of the Soviet Union and China's opening to some degree of free market, global capitalism, a new series of challenges have risen from within liberal democracies, both established and new.

Right- and left-wing populism has captured the dissatisfaction of those groups left relatively behind or even threatened by global liberal democracy and free markets.

From the right, rising immigration from developing and Third World countries exacerbated by liberal policies pursued in the US by the Democratic party and in the EU by the center from the left Schengen consensus combined with the 2008 financial crisis and rising unemployment has fueled the rise to power of strong nationalist and xenophobic right-wing populism.

In established liberal democracies, it is the liberal institutions that have come under immediate attack. Leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński, Brazil’s Jair Bolsanaro, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and America’s Donald Trump were all legitimately elected, and have used their electoral mandates to attack liberal institutions in the first instance. These include the courts and justice system, nonpartisan state bureaucracies, independent media, and other bodies limiting executive power under a system of checks and balances."

And also a rise in left-wing populism in Spain, the US, and Latin America

Liberalism has been challenged in recent years not just by populists of the right, but from a renewed progressive left as well.The critique from this quarter evolved from a charge—correct in itself—that liberal societies were not living up to their own ideals of equal treatment of all groups.

There is ample evidence that democracy not necessarily favors liberal systems, particularly when these bring rising unequal outcomes for certain groups -blue-collar native whites on the Right and immigrants from illiberal cultures on the Left.

These new realities are turning upside down the traditional Right and Left political constituencies and clientele: blue-collar workers vote for Far Right candidates and immigrants fleeing Third World socialism vote for an open-borders Left in the EU.

A growing polarization goes hand in hand with ethnic, class, and nationalistic divisions fueled by populist vote-capturing rhetoric. 

Fukuyama notices a growing number of democracies that are turning illiberal by exacerbating the power of an executive strongman favored by local ethnic majorities: blue-collar whites in the US follow if not Trump, "trumpist", 'Tea Party" nationalistic ideas. In Europe, France's centrist government is under siege from the "yellow jackets" disaffected native French rejecting liberal "elites" that tolerate massive unassimilated Islamic immigration. The same situation occurs in all of Western Europe. Russia is also promoting a pan-Slavic, pan-Russian redesign of the post-WWII borders following ethnic and linguistic lines.

The Left wing's challenge to liberal democracy in Latin America and Europe also exploits historical ethnic nationalism -from the pre-Colombian descendants in Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina carving land through rewriting constitutions and referendums to the Catalan and Basque separatists in  Spain-.

The world that Fukuyama describes bears an eery resemblance with the one that preceded WWI a hundred years ago. The war in Ukraine resembles the territorial annexations and alliances that triggered both World Wars of the 20th century.